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 The measures may also be more subtle.  For instance, in early 1999 Brazil increased the
share of local financial firm’s portfolio that must be held in domestic sovereign bonds (see
Edison and Reinhart, 1999 for details).
1. Introduction
In the 1990s net capital inflows to developing countries grew substantially, particularly to
those countries that had liberalized their capital accounts.  As countries experienced surges in
capital flows, the debate on how to manage these surges became a pressing policy topic.  Capital
controls when they were discussed at all, were examined in the context of liberalizing restrictions
on capital outflows, or in terms of which types of capital inflows should be taxed.  However,
with the most recent wave of financial market turbulence there has been a shift in the debate on
capital controls.  The types of controls that were contemplated or used during the recent crises
were very different from the measures introduced during the inflow phase of the capital flow
cycle.1 These types of controls are applied mainly to outflows and are viewed as “last resort”
measures as opposed to controls being applied to inflows which were interpreted as “prudential.”
Controls on capital outflows have been advocated as a way of dealing with financial and
currency crises.  These controls can take a number of forms: restrictions on capital account
transactions including taxes on funds remitted abroad, outright prohibition of funds’ transfers,
dual exchange rates and outright prohibition of cross-border movement of funds.2  The idea
behind these measures is that they help slow down the drainage of international reserves and
capital outflows and give the authorities time to implement corrective policies.  Paul Krugman
(1998) has argued that countries facing major crisis might benefit from temporary imposition of
controls on outflows, by giving the country the time to lower their domestic interest rates and put
3
 For example, after the introduction of capital controls in Malaysia other measures were
introduced to stimulate the economy and reduce the burden of banks.  
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into place a pro-growth package.3  Malaysia and, for a short while, Thailand followed this path in
1997-99. 
The initial reaction to the imposition of controls, especially for Malaysia, was quite
negative.  Subsequently, however, Malaysia seems to have fared reasonably well--although not as
well as Korea, which did not introduce new restrictions on capital movements.  Furthermore,
institutional investors appear to have short memories, as Malaysia’s controls do not seem to have
reduced investors’ appetite for returning to Malay capital markets once controls were eased.  To
quote a recent article on Malaysia...
“Stocks of companies that were sold off two years ago and criticized for crony capitalist
practices are being snapped up by foreign buyers at a fevered pace.  Most companies
have done little to address the flaws that foreign investors decried at the time.  Almost all
companies are under the same management as they were then.”
Thomas Fuller, International Herald Tribune, Paris, January 18, 2000.
Not surprisingly, the use of such “market unfriendly” measures in times of stress is
receiving considerable attention among academic and policy circles.  The purpose of this study is
to examine systematically two crisis-capital control episodes, Malaysia 1998-1999, and Thailand
1997--in greater detail. We aim to assess the extent to which the capital controls were effective
and successful in delivering some of the outcomes that motivated their inception in the first
place.
For our case studies, we look at two types of data.  First, we study monthly data.  We
4
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focus on the movement of foreign exchange reserves and capital flows.  In addition, we examine
data from the United States International Capital Reports (TIC) to investigate how US portfolio
flows changed in the aftermath of controls.  This data spans January 1988 to March 1999.
Second, we examine daily data covering the period January 1996 through July 23, 1999 for key
financial variables including: interest rates, equity market returns, exchange rate changes,
domestic-foreign interest rate differentials, and bid-ask spreads on foreign exchange.
We employ a variety of empirical tests to attempt to examine the effectiveness of capital
controls.  For the monthly data, we test for differences in basic descriptive statistics in the capital
control and no control periods.  For the daily data, we also consider tests for the equality of
moments and changes in persistence to address changes in behavior of key financial variables.  In
addition, we test for changes in cross border volatility using GARCH tests for the effects of
controls on volatility, as in Edwards (1998).
There are, of course, several limitations and concerns with the kind of analysis we
undertake.  First, results are episode specific--not “stylized facts.”   Second, given that these
kinds of controls are introduced during periods of turbulence, it is particularly difficult to
separate what owes to the controls and what is due to the financial crisis per se.  For instance, a
generalized withdrawal from risk-taking (as what followed the Russia/LTCM episode in the fall
of 1998) can have similar implications and outcomes as the introduction of capital controls.4
Namely, international flows dry up, spreads widen, volatility in asset markets increases, and so
on.  In addition, our empirical methodology assumes linearities in relationships, which may break
down during period of extreme market stress--an issue that is highlighted in multiple-equilibria
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 As shown in Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) and reproduced here, however,
mutual fund flows to Malaysia turn sharply negative after the introduction of capital controls.
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crises models.  These caveats apply especially to analysis of the daily data but also to the monthly
data we consider as well.
With these caveats in mind, our key empirical findings are summarized below.  First, the
monthly data on foreign reserves and capital flows highlight some of the differences in the Malay
and Thai experiences with capital controls. The monthly results suggest that in Malaysia
economic relationships changed; while in Thailand things seemed to continue to get worse.  For
example, foreign exchange reserves continued to fall during the period of capital controls in
Thailand, while they increased immediately following the imposition of controls in Malaysia.5
Second, we find interest rates were less variable in both Malaysia and Thailand 
following the introduction of controls, but the level was lower only in Malaysia during the
control period.  Stock returns tended to be more variable following the introduction of capital
controls--especially so in the case of Thailand--consistent with the view that more of the burden
of adjustment falls on prices when the change in quantities is restricted.  The exchange rate was
more stable during the control period for Malaysia, while they were more variable for Thailand. 
Third, as to the side-effects of capital controls, we find that foreign exchange bid-ask
spreads were uniformly wider and more variable during the control periods.  Also, onshore-
offshore interest rate spreads widened and become more volatile following the introduction of
controls.
Fourth,  our results suggest that there is little evidence that capital controls were effective
in reducing volatility spillovers.  In the case of Malaysia, the results suggest that capital controls
5dampened the spillover, but it did not eliminate the spillover, although this result was not robust
across all model specifications.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the reasons
countries might apply controls and the theoretical predictions of the effects of those controls. 
Section 3 describes the measures and their chronology in Malaysia and Thailand.  The following
two sections examine the effectiveness of capital controls, describing empirical tests performed,
their outcomes, and their implications.  First, we focus on monthly data, examining capital flows
and other macroeconomic indicators.  Then we consider daily data, assessing financial variables
including interest rates, equity returns, and exchange rate changes.  The final section discusses
possible extensions and policy implications of the analysis. 
2. Theoretical Predictions of the Effects of Controls
In this section, we first review some of the reasons most often voiced by policy makers
for resorting to capital controls during periods of turbulence.  Knowing what the stated
expectations from the policy change are in the first place is essential to assess whether the policy
was “effective” or “successful.”  Since many of these expectations are based on an implicit
model, we then proceed to summarize the implications of capital controls for some of the
variables of interest.
2.1 Reasons for resorting to capital controls during crises periods
The first line of defense by central banks dealing with speculative attacks on their
currencies is usually to sell off their holdings of foreign exchange.  However, central bank
holdings of foreign exchange are often inadequate to support the currency and, even if the initial
stock is high by international standards, recurring runs on the currency can quickly deplete the
6initial war chest.  Not surprisingly, policy makers will often cite the need to stem the drain on
foreign exchange reserves as a motivation for introducing capital controls during periods of
extreme market stress.
Also central banks can (and often do) react to speculative pressures by raising interest
rates, occasionally to prohibitively high levels.  However, given the consequences of high interest
rates on economic activity and debt servicing costs, this policy alternative is not particularly
appealing either--especially if the pressures persist over an extended period and the domestic
financial system is weak.  Hence, capital controls are seen as a course of action which would
enable the monetary authorities to maintain lower (and more stable) interest rates than would be
the case under free capital mobility--especially if credibility has been lost.  More generally,
controls can (if they are effective) fulfill the authorities’ desire to regain autonomy in monetary
policy--without floating the exchange rate.  
Since volatile international bond and equity portfolio flows are frequently viewed as a
destabilizing force in asset markets and, more generally, in the financial system,  another reason
which is often cited for introducing controls is the desire to reduce the volatility in asset prices.
2.2 Theoretical priors
The Mundellian trinity suggests that fixed (or quasi fixed) exchange rates, independent
monetary policy, and perfect capital mobility cannot be achieved simultaneously.  Capital
controls are a way of allowing the authorities to retain simultaneous control over the interest rate
and the exchange rate.  Capital controls may be particularly appealing when the authorities are
reluctant to allow the exchange rate to float freely, which is the case in most emerging markets
6
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 Of course, imperfect asset substitutability and a time varying risk premia are sufficient
to explain a breakdown of uncovered interest parity--even in the absence of capital controls.
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(EMs).6  Fear of floating may arise for a variety of reasons, including the dollarization of
liabilities--but for the purposes at hand, however, those reasons are not central to our analysis.
The important point for our analysis is that controls introduce a systematic wedge between
domestic and foreign interest rates.  As uncovered interest rate parity breaks down, the domestic
policy interest rate (from the vantage point of a small open economy) need not follow
international interest rates.7  In principle, variation in that wedge can be introduced by the
authorities to influence the exchange rate systematically. One example of this is the theoretical
model of Reinhart and Reinhart (1998), who trace out the effects of one of the simplest forms of
capital controls--a reserve requirement.  Depending on the degree of competition among financial
intermediaries, Reinhart and Reinhart show that the wedge between foreign and domestic interest
rates induced by the reserve requirement influences the response of the exchange rate and the real
economy to shocks.  
The potential consequences of capital controls become even more persuasive in models
that provide an important role for asset stocks in affecting an economy.  The general mechanism
at work is that, if the flow of capital is restricted in any way, then the burden of adjustment in
asset markets falls more on prices.  Calvo and Rodriguez (1978) first showed how sluggishness
in the flow of international assets can generate overshooting of the exchange rate. Reinhart
(1998) broadened that model by incorporating equity prices and introducing three different kinds
of restrictions on capital flows. The implication in Reinhart’s framework is that equity price
8volatility should increase with the imposition of controls. A shock to the desired portfolio
allocation generally triggers adjustments to both asset quantities and prices.  Capital controls
shift more of that adjustment toward prices and, to the extent that they introduce interest rate
wedges, may also alter the relationship between asset prices and the policy rate.
Edison and Reinhart (1999), provide details about the predictions of theory for a host of
financial variables.  Some of the key predictions are as follows:
• The declines in foreign exchange reserves and the capital outflows should both either
stop or reverse itself.
• The level of domestic interest rates should decline as high interest rates are no longer
necessary to prevent capital outflows.  There should also be a decline in interest rate
volatility.
• The implications of a decline in market liquidity--whether owing to a capital control or
a generalized withdrawal from risk taking-- are also straightforward.  Bid-ask spreads in
the market(s) where liquidity has diminished should widen and become more volatile.
3. The Control Episodes
In this section, we describe the timing and nature of the selected capital control episodes
as well as some of the more relevant events surrounding the introduction and lifting of these
measures. 
 3.1 The policy measures and chronology of events
 The capital control episodes that we analyze are: Thailand (May 14, 1997-January 30,
1998) and  Malaysia (September 1, 1998 to present).  The chronology of the episodes and further
details of the measures are summarized in Table1.  We briefly discuss these episodes below.
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 It is important to consider the highly leveraged condition of the Malay economy at this
time, with bank loan to GDP ratios of about one-hundred-and-sixty percent.
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In the face of speculative attacks, the Thai authorities imposed capital controls in May
1997.  The goal of these controls was to stabilize the foreign exchange market as speculative
pressure continued to mount.  The Bank of Thailand was concerned that using an interest rate
defense as a means to defend the baht would have adverse effects on economic activity and the
banking system.  The capital control measures put in place were aimed at closing the channels for
speculation; creating a two-tiered currency market.  This system was aimed at denying
speculators access to funds.  The measures they used were not as sweeping as those the
Malaysian subsequently put in place.  However, the controls initially seemed to work as offshore
interest rates rose above the domestic rates.  The baht was floated on July 2, 1997 and controls
were left in place until January 30, 1998.  
In September 1998, the Malaysian authorities imposed a number of administrative
exchange and capital control measures aimed at containing ringgit speculation and the outflow of
capital. The measures sought to increase monetary independence and insulate the economy from
potential shocks from the global economy, like Russia and LTCM.  The Malaysian authorities
were concerned that domestic interest rates would have to be kept unusually high for long
periods of time, producing unhelpful effects on economic activity and the banking system. 8
Hence in September they closed all channels for the transfer of ringgit abroad and required
repatriation of ringgit held abroad to Malaysia.  In addition they block the repatriation of
portfolio capital held by nonresidents for 12 months, and imposed restrictions on transfer of
capital by residents.  These controls were supported by additional measures to eliminate
10
loopholes.  On February 4, 1999, the 12-month holding restriction was replaced with a declining
scale of exit levies.
There are two obvious differences between the Thai and Malaysian experience.  The first
difference is that Thailand was undergoing speculative attacks and tried to use capital controls as
a defense mechanism.  In contrast, Malaysia was not undergoing extreme speculative pressure
when they applied their controls.  The second difference is that the Malaysian controls were
broad and attempted to eliminate all obvious loopholes.  In contrast, the controls Thailand put
into place, at least in hindsight, were not comprehensive enough to eliminate the speculative
pressure on the baht.   
4. The Effectiveness of Controls: Impact on Capital Flows 
In this section we attempt to describe broadly the economic situation prior to the
application of capital controls and the subsequent developments, considering data on economic
activity, foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, and exchange rates.  In addition, we examine
monthly capital flow data, using those data from the U.S. international Capital Transaction
Report.  The data on mutual fund flows is taken from the broader study of the patterns and
determinants of these flows by Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000). The focus is on
monthly data; consequently the empirical methods we use are descriptive in nature.
4.1 Economic Performance
There are a limited number of tests that one can use to analyze the monthly data as there
are too few observations during the period of controls in both cases.  Graphs and a quick look at
some descriptive statistics illustrate vast differences in the results that capital controls appear to
have yielded in Malaysia and Thailand.
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Figure1 shows plots of data on industrial production, foreign exchange reserves, interest
rates, and the exchange rate for Malaysia.   Since September 1998, industrial production has
increased more than 8 percent, despite dropping significantly after controls were initially applied. 
Foreign exchange reserves rose steadily up from $20 billion in late August 1998 to $27 billion in
April 1999.   Interest rates have fallen to below pre-crisis levels.  In 1997, interest rates averaged
just over 7 percent; in June 1999 these same 1-month interest rates were slightly more than 3
percent.   In addition, the exchange rate which had started depreciating in July 1997 was
stabilized by the authorities, pegging the rate against the dollar.  Taken by themselves, these facts
suggest that the capital controls may have helped Malaysia insulate its economy.  Yet, the
behavior of interest rates and economic activity of the other crisis-hit countries, Korea and
Thailand, have also enjoyed many of these benefits around the same time as Malaysia.  It is not
clear whether these capital controls contributed to improving Malaysia’s performance.  At a
minimum, this finding suggests that capital controls did not harm Malaysia--as some critics of
the measures feared.  However, as Figure 2 (taken from Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler, 2000)
suggest, in the month of September 1998 (labeled After the Russian Crisis--which began on
August 17, 1998) Malaysia posted record outflows among the countries in the sample, casting a
lukewarm reading on the success of the controls.  
Figure 3 gives the same data for Thailand.  A completely different story emerges when
considering the economic performance of Thailand, following their use of capital controls.  As
noted earlier, Thailand applied capital controls in May 1997 hoping to prevent a full-blown
currency crisis.  In contrast to Malaysia, Thailand was not able to prevent the crisis and in fact
some policymakers have argued that the capital controls may have exacerbated the problem for
12
Thailand.  Figure 3 shows that industrial output declined, foreign exchange reserves fell, interest
rates rose and the exchange rate lost half of its value against the dollar.  These observations
suggest that capital controls failed to stop the currency crisis. It is important to note, however,
that while Thailand introduced the controls in the midst of crisis, Malaysia’s controls were
introduced at a time in which financial markets had begun to settle.  This difference in timing
may also be a key factor in explaining the difference between the two countries’ outcomes.
The top panels of Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for (mean and standard
errors) for foreign reserves and private capital flows for the two countries.  The table also reports
tests for the equality of first and second moments between capital control and free capital
mobility.  For Malaysia (Table 2) we find that the average level of foreign reserves is higher
during the control episode, but this difference is not statistically significant.   In Thailand (Table
3), we find that foreign reserves are, on average, lower during the capital controls period and that
outflows are higher and more variable.  The results for Thailand are statistically significant and
are quite suggestive that controls did not insulate the Thai economy.  
Figure 4 shows private capital flow data for Malaysia (upper panel) and Thailand (lower
panel).  Both figures are plotted in local currency -- ringgit for Malaysia and baht for Thailand. 
Unfortunately,  the data for Malaysia are quarterly and end in 1998 Q4, owing to long reporting
lags.  It appears that the large capital outflows stopped following the application of capital
controls.  Note that there was also a huge capital outflow the third quarter of 1997, owing to the
general crisis in Asia.  The lower panel which shows capital flows for Thailand suggests that
Thailand’s capital controls were not effective in preventing outflows of capital.  From May 1997
through the crisis capital outflows increased despite the use of capital controls.  
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4.2 Capital Flows to and from the United States: the TIC Data
In this section we employ a data base on US capital flows to and from Malaysia and
Thailand, starting in January 1988 and ending in March 1999.  The frequency of the data is
monthly and these times series were constructed using the International Capital Reports of the
US Treasury Department.  We consider four broad categories of flows in the capital account:
equity flows, bond flows excluding official US flows (U.S. corporate and foreign bonds), all
bond flows, and total flows. We construct both gross and net flows.  Many studies seem to use
net measures for equity and gross measures for bond flows.  Gross bond flow measures tend to be
used to abstract from the effect of sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve
operations.
Once again we employ descriptive statistics in analyzing the data.  The lower panels of
table 2 and 3 report the results for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively.  In the case of Malaysia,
controls in general do not seem to be associated with lower capital flows to/from the United
States.  There is some indication that gross bond flows and especially equity flows were lower
during the period of capital controls, but most of the time this difference was not statistically
significant.  This result might arise in part because the data focus exclusively on flows to and
from the United States which was not heavily involved in Malaysia and in part because the
period prior to the employment of controls lead to a significant amount of capital outflow and
volatility.
The results for Thailand are suggestive that, if anything, capital flows increased during
the period of capital controls.  For example, gross flows on all bonds, nearly doubled during the
control period.  These flows rose on average from $1.5 billion to over $3 billion during the
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controls period.  As noted earlier there is a problem with these figures.  The data  include official
flows as a result of the intervention in the foreign exchange market by the Bank of Thailand. 
Despite the fact that the numbers are not statistically significant, the results consistently show
that the level and the variability of these flows increased during the control episode.  
Overall, our examination of the monthly data suggests that the experiences of Malaysia
and Thailand were quite different.  In the next section we analyze their experiences further using
daily financial data.    
5. The Effectiveness of Controls: Evidence from Daily Financial Data
In this section, we employ an eclectic variety of tests to examine whether the periods
when capital controls are in place are different.  First, we examine the movement of these data
looking at changes in mean, variance, and persistence.   We then turn our attention to testing for
volatility spillovers. 
5.1  Interest rates, stock returns and exchange rates during control and crises periods
In section 2, we provided a sketch of what theory predicts as regards the behavior of
selected key financial variables following the introduction of measures that curtail international
capital movements.  In this section, we confront those predictions with the data from the two
recent episodes.  We examine the behavior of daily interest rates and changes in interest rates,
stock returns, exchange rate changes, bid-ask spreads on foreign exchange, domestic-foreign
interest rate differentials, and onshore-offshore interest rate differentials (where relevant).  
For each of these time series we provide descriptive statistics (mean and standard errors)
and test for the equality of first and second moments between the capital control and free capital
mobility periods.   A correlogram for the individual subperiods is also used to assess whether the 
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persistence of shocks changes as a result of the change in policy. We compare the crisis and
tranquil periods with the aim of assessing the extent to which observed changes in the key
variables may be attributed to the crisis rather than the capital controls.  Tables 4 and 5 reports
the results for each country.
In the case of Malaysia (Table 4), controls seem to be associated with the kind of changes
one would expect a priori if the controls were effective.  The interest rate declines, and its level
becomes more stable and persistent.  Domestic-foreign interest rate spreads become lower and
less variable.  This holds for the spreads based on three, six and twelve months.  Similarly, the
exchange rate also becomes more stable (the ringgit was pegged to the US dollar on September 2,
1998).  However, as the burden of adjustment in asset markets falls more on prices than on
quantities, equity prices become more volatile. Bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market
widen and became more volatile, reflecting reduced market liquidity.
The upper panel of figure 5 shows that bid-ask spreads are indeed more volatile,
compared to spreads prior to the floatation of the Thai baht in July 1997.  However, starting in
July 1997, there was a sharp widening of spreads which continued to deteriorate until controls
were applied.  With the application of capital controls, the large increase in volatility brought on
by the region’s financial crisis diminished, but volatility remained above pre-crisis levels.
The results for the pre- and post-control comparisons for Thailand (Table 5) are
somewhat different from those we saw for Malaysia.  In both countries, the volatility of interest
rates declines during the control episode; but the level of interest rates rises.  Similarly, domestic-
foreign interest rate spreads widened, but do not become more volatile.  Stock returns tended to
be more variable following the introduction of capital controls consistent with the view that more
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of the burdens of adjustment fall on prices when the change in quantities is restricted.  We also
see an increase in exchange rate variability during the control period.  Both the table and the
lower panel of figure 5 shows that the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange market widened
and that volatility increased after Thailand applied capital controls. 
Figure 6 plots Thai onshore-offshore interest rates at the one-month and three-month
horizon.  The onshore and offshore rates were for all practical purposes identical prior to May
1997.  In May, the Thai authorities imposed controls on capital transactions, shielding domestic
interest rates.  Initially, as figure 6 shows, the controls effectively drove a wedge between
onshore and offshore interest rates.   The differential widened significantly and became more
variable as controls squeezed liquidity in the offshore market.  However, the segmentation of the
market, especially after the baht floated, disappeared as the differential between the two rates
narrowed. 
Overall, the results between the two countries are quite different.  The shared
characteristics are: less variable interest rates, widening bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange
market and more variable stock prices.  Otherwise, the financial variables reacted differently in
the two markets, with the reactions in Malaysia conforming more to those one would anticipated. 
In Edison and Reinhart we also consider the movement of these variables in South Korea and the
Philippines to control for whether these differences arose in part to the general turmoil created by
the financial crisis and what might be associated with the introduction of capital controls.  In
general, we found that interest rate variability does not decline during the crisis period (they
increased in Korea), equity price volatility is higher in both countries as the crisis unfolds and for
the Philippines market liquidity appears to deteriorate during the crisis as bid-ask spreads on
9These are unchanged for South Korea. 
10
 In all cases a GARCH (1, 1) model was estimated.
17
foreign exchange widen and become more volatile.9
5.2 Volatility and capital controls
The descriptive statistics discussed earlier clearly suggested that there were important
differences across regimes in second moments (i.e., variances) in a high share of the financial
variables analyzed.  Furthermore, our theoretical priors suggested that there should be such
differences. In this subsection, we focus on how capital controls and crises affect the volatility of
interest rates and stock returns.  
A related issue was recently examined in Edwards (1998).  Using weekly interest rate
data for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, Edwards (1998) analyzed the consequences of the
Mexican crisis for interest rate volatility in Argentina and Chile.  The “Mexican spillover”
dummies were statistically significant for Argentina, irrespective of the specification used, and
uniformly insignificant for Chile.  One possible interpretation of these results, he concluded, is
that Chile’s capital controls were effective in insulating Chile from the turmoil abroad. 
In what follows, we will work with a variety of generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to examine whether was an observed change in volatility
during the capital controls episodes.10  As before, we will contrast these results to the crises
episodes in the Philippines and South Korea where no controls are imposed during the crisis.  We
consider the following models:
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and
where the domestic nominal interest rate is denoted by rt, in equation (1), the foreign interest
rates for the other four countries in the study are denoted by the  r*jt, and the random shock is
denoted by .  In the variance equation,  is the mean of the variance; the lag of the mean
squared residual from the mean equation (i.e., 2t-1 ) is the ARCH term and last period’s forecast
variance (i.e., 2t-1) is the GARCH term.  The term dummyc is a dummy variable that takes on the
value of one during the control period for Malaysia and Thailand and zero otherwise. The
number of autoregressive lags, k, is reported for the cases k=0, 5, and 10.  We also estimate the
model in first differences ( rt, shown in equation 2) and for the case where the rs and r*s refer to
equity returns.  As discussed earlier, periods of turbulence that are part of our sample of daily
observations render the assumption of identically and independently distributed conditionally
normal disturbances in the basic GARCH model inadequate.  Given the presence of
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heteroskedastic disturbances in our sample, we use the methods described in Bollersev and
Woolridge (1992) to compute the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood covariances and standard errors.
The results for interest rates, changes in interest rates, and stock returns, are reported in
Tables 6-8.  As to the specification for nominal interest rates, while both ARCH and GARCH
terms are statistically significant in Malaysia and Thailand (Table 6), the capital control dummy
variable is only significant for Malaysia--although this result is not robust across alternative lag
specifications.  In the case of Malaysia, the controls dummy variable has the anticipated negative
sign, while in the case of Thailand the sign is positive, although not statistically significant.   For
the two countries that did not introduce capital controls, the crisis dummy variable is not
statistically significant.
Turning next to the results for the first differences of interest rates (shown in Tables 7),
we find the same pattern.  Among the four countries we report, the dummy variable is only
significant for Malaysia for most of the lag profiles used.  Finally, for daily equity price returns,
the control dummy is significant and positive for Thailand, indicating the control period was
associated with above-average volatility in the equity market (Table 8).  However, it is difficult
to attribute the increased volatility exclusively to the controls.  Note that the crisis period in the
Philippines (despite the absence of new capital account restrictions) was also associated with
higher equity market volatility.
All in all, while the GARCH results do not point to across-the-board differences in
volatility across capital account regimes, the three cases where the control dummies are
significant (interest rates and interest rate changes in Malaysia and equity returns in Thailand)
have the expected sign.
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6. Final Remarks
In this paper we examined the recent application of capital controls in Malaysia and
Thailand using monthly and daily data.  First, we focused on monthly data considering broad
changes in economic performance, foreign exchange reserves, and capital flows.  Then we
examined daily financial variables, focusing on changes in those key financial variables and
testing for volatility spillovers.
The conclusion that emerges from our empirical work is that the controls used in
Thailand did not appear to deliver much of what they were intended.  By contrast, in the case of
Malaysia, the controls did align more closely with the priors of what controls were intended to
achieve – namely, greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy--
although initially, at least, these measures did not prevent mutual funds from exiting the country.
It should be noted that one cannot draw general policy conclusions from the results of this
paper as they are based on a scanty set of experiences.    The results do suggest that the timing of
capital controls and the types of controls that are applied might have something to do with the
success of controls.  One could speculate that Thailand’s offshore banking center provided
leakage and arbitrage opportunities that were absent in Malaysia.  Further research on the
effectiveness of capital controls should include more countries, classify the timing of controls,
differentiate between types of controls.
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Table 1  A Chronology of Key Events
Episode and country Date Key events
Thailand, Asian risis,
1997-1998 May 14
May 28
June 2
June 10
June 18
July 2
September 23
January 7, 1998
January 30, 1998
February 3, 1998
Bank of Thailand (BOT) introduces
restrictions on capital account transactions.
BOT limits outright forward transactions.
BOT introduces additional measures to limit
capital flows.
Baht proceeds from sales of stocks required to
be converted at the onshore exchange rate.
Additional controls are introduced.
The onshore-offshore interest rate differential
hits a peak at 639 percent.
BOT introduces a two-tier exchange rate.
Thai baht is devalued.
Additional controls on invisible and current
account transactions are introduced.
Proceeds on exports and invisible transactions
and current account transfers must be
surrendered after 7 days (instead of 15 days).
BOT ends two-tier exchange rate.
The stock market suffers its largest one-day
decline ( 9.5 percent).
Malaysia, Asian
crisis, 1997-1998
July 14, 1997
January 5, 1998
September 1, 1998
September 2, 1998
September 7, 1998
February 4, 1999
Interest rates peak.
Ringgit suffers its largest daily decline (7.5
percent) against the dollar.
Exchange controls introduced.
Exchange rate is fixed.
The stocks market suffers its largest one-day
decline (down 22 percent).
Exchange controls modified. New rule
introduced to replace one-year holding period
rule for portfolio capital. Under the new rules,
a declining scale of exit levies replaced 
the 12-month holding restriction on
repatriation of portfolio capital.
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Table 2 Malaysia, January 1988 to March 1999: Descriptive Statistics for Monthly Data
Variable Mean
No
controls
Mean
Control
period
Equality in
means t-test
Probability
Standard
deviation
No controls
Standard
deviation
Controls
Equality in
variance 
test 1/
Foreign Exchange Reserves 23.5 24.9 0.26 2.9 2.7 0.85
Private Capital Flows Na Na Na Na Na Na
US TIC Capital Flows:
Gross Flows
 All 2144.5 508 0.05** 2214.6 242.5 0.003*
 All bonds 1838.9 430.9 0.07** 2054.3 212.2 0.03*
 US Pvt & for. bonds 142.3 49.1 .29 227.4 49.5 .23
 Equity 327.8 124.3 0.1 325.0 51.7 0.08**
Net Flows
 All -58.5 99.2 0.3 393.2 234.8 0.9
 All bonds -45.9 74.0 0.4 395.2 193.4 0.9
 US Pvt & for. bonds - lvl  -37.5 -6.6 0.7 211.9 38.2 0.7
 Equity -17.5 19.4 0.2 66.4 62.7 0.4
 Malay Outflow
 Equity 155.1 71.9 0.2 159.4 56.3 0.08**
 Malay Inflow
 Equity 172.6 52.4 0.07** 172.1 11.5 0.19
Notes to Table: Control Period is September 1998 to end of sample.  (*) denotes significant at 5 percent level and
(**) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.  Reported test is based on Siegel-Tukey test.
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Table 3 Thailand, January 1988 to March 1999: Descriptive Statistics for Monthly Capital Flow Data
Variable Mean
No
controls
Mean
Control
period
Equality in
means t-test
Probability
Standard
deviation
No controls
Standard
deviation
Control
Equality in
variance 
test 1/
Foreign Exchange Reserves 32.8 28.2 0.02* 5.3 2.8 0.5
Private Capital Flows 11907 -54366 0.00* 36776 71554 0.01*
US TIC Capital Flows:
Gross Flows
 All 1629.4 3243.9 0.00* 1566.4 1672.4 0.51
 All bonds 1577.2 3133.8 0.00* 1560.0 1660.3 0.52
 US Pvt & for. bonds   11.1 25.7 0.0* 11.6 12.7 0.03*
 Equity 55.7 111.5 0.09** 88.7 175.2 0.46
Net Flows
 All 476.9 585.6 0.66 711.3 884.9 0.00*
 All bonds  490.3 672.4 0.47 717.6 891.8 0.00*
 US Pvt & for. bonds  1.3 -1.3 0.3 7.2 7.4 0.9
 Equity  -12.4 -84.8 0.01* 79.7 161.8 0.41
 Malay Outflow
 Equity- 21.6 13.3 0.43 31.2 14.3 0.48
 Malay Inflow
   Equity 34.0 98.2 0.03* 78.3 168.1 0.72
Notes to Table: Control Period is May 1997 to January  1998.  (*) denotes significant at 5 percent level and (**)
denotes significant at the 10 percent level.  Reported test is based on Siegel-Tukey test.
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Table 4 Malaysia, January 1, 1996 to July 23, 1999 : Descriptive Statistics for Daily Data
Variable Mean
No
controls
Mean
Control
period
Equality in
means t-
test
Probability
Standard
deviation
No
controls
Standard
deviation
Control
period
Equality
in
variance 
test 1/
Auto
correlation
No
controls
Auto
correlation
Control
period
Interest
Rate
8.328 5.720 0.000* 1.549 1.452 0.000* 0.935 0.956
Change in
interest
rate
0.121 -0.545 0.004* 0.386 0.140 0.157 0.212 0.219
Domestic/
foreign
interest
rate
spread:
3-month
3.192 1.473 0.000* 1.490 1.469 0.002* 0.912 0.934
Domestic/
foreign
interest
rate
spread:
6-month
3.163 1.491 0.000* 1.586 1.463 0.000* 0.914 0.940
Domestic/
foreign
interest
rate
spread:
12-month
3.045 1.541 0.000* 1.699 1.493 0.000* 0.925 0.942
Stock
returns
-0.194 0.652 0.000* 2.089 3.385 0.000* -0.080 0.133
Exchange
rate
changes
0.064 -0.011 0.405 1.241 0.166 0.000* -0.011 0.049
Bid-ask
spread
-0.006 -0.008 0.012* 0.015 0.006 0.000* 0.153 0.275
1/ Siegel-Tukey test is reported.  Other test results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5 Thailand, January 1, 1996 to July 23, 1999: Descriptive Statistics for Daily Data
Variable Mean
No
controls
Mean
Control
period
Equality in
means t-
test
Probability
Standard
deviation
No
controls
Standard
deviation
Control
period
Equality
in
variance 
test 1/
Auto
correlation
No
controls
Auto
correlation
Control
period
Interest
Rate
12.461 20.920 0.000* 5.779 3.829 0.000* 0.930 0.912
Change in
interest
rate
-0.0318 0.073 0.067 0.600 0.818 0.000* -0.061 0.202
Domestic/
foreign
interest
rate
spread:
1-month
7.704 15.941 0.000* 5.609 3.804 0.075
Stock
returns
-0.114 0.019 0.510 2.153 2.923 0.000* 0.115 0.258
Exchange
rate
changes
-0.047 0.361 0.000* 0.828 2.623 0.000* 0.047 -0.123
Bid-ask
spread
-0.074 -0.313 0.000* 0.111 0.978 0.033* 0.318 0.474
Onshore-offshore interest rate spreads
Overnight 1.336 16.730 0.000* 4.878 85.488 0.000* 0.332 0.872
Weekly 3.978 17.004 0.000* 7.900 58.323 0.000* 0.725 0.882
One-
month
4.381 11.633 0.000* 6.420 22.955 0.000* 0.806 0.869
Three-
month
4.067 6.988 0.000* 4.923 6.937 0.021* 0.845 0.867
Six-
month
3.655 5.097 0.035* 7.973 6.136 0.000* 0.158 0.850
12-month 2.807 3.916 0.000* 2.978 3.752 0.000* 0.882 0.813
1/ Siegel-Tukey test is reported.  Other test results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6  Daily Interest Rates Variance Equation: Volatility Spillovers With and Without Capital Controls
Bollersev-Woolridge robust standard errors and covariance, GARCH (1,1)
Number of
autoregressive lags
included
ARCH (1) GARCH (1) Controls dummy
Malaysia
0 0.503
(0.045)*
0.559
(0.000)*
-0.004
(0.129)
5 1.464
(0.000)*
0.117
(0.060)*
-0.005
(0.131)
10 1.442
(0.003)*
0.136
(0.037)*
-0.008
(0.021)*
Thailand
0 0.331
(0.081)*
0.603
(0.000)*
0.073
(0.133)
5 0.342
(0.062)*
0.582
(0.000)*
0.074
(0.109)
10 0.355
(0.055)*
0.576
(0.000)*
0.072
(0.111)
Philippines
0 0.099
(0.363)
0.697
(0.011)*
-0.011
(0.506)
5 2.635
(0.002)*
0.109
(0.036)*
-0.045
(0.243)
10 4.295
(0.001)*
0.003
(0.489)
-0.046
(0.236)
South Korea 
0 0.347
(0.018)*
0.046
(0.000)*
0.007
(0.860)
5 0.278
(0.012)*
0.816
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.813)
10 0.275
(0.014)*
0.816
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.775)
Notes to table: In all cases an ARCH (1) or a GARCH(1,1) model was estimated.  The controls dummy variable
takes on the value of one during the control period for Malaysia, and Thailand and zero otherwise.  For the
Philippines and South Korea the dummy variable takes on a value of one during the crisis period and zero
otherwise.  
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Table 7  Daily Interest Rate Changes Variance Equation:Volatility Spillovers With and Without Capital Controls
Bollersev-Woolridge robust standard errors and covariance, GARCH (1,1)
Number of
autoregressive lags
included
ARCH (1) GARCH (1) Controls dummy
Malaysia
0 0.465
(0.041)*
0.583
(0.000)*
-0.004
(0.119)
5 0.543
(0.050)*
0.495
(0.000)*
-0.005
(0.100)*
10 1.492
(0.001)*
0.083
(0.079)*
-0.009
(0.025)*
Thailand
0 0.316
(0.090)*
0.601
(0.000)*
0.078
(0.136)
5 0.338
(0.067)*
0.571
(0.000)*
0.078
(0.112)
10 0.345
(0.058)*
0.577
(0.000)*
0.072
(0.111)
Philippines
0 0.108
(0.400)
0.664
(0.078)*
-0.013
(0.529)
5 0.100
(0.419)
0.666
(0.064)*
-0.012
(0.524)
10 0.157
(0.292)
0.490
(0.073)
-0.002
(0.389)
South Korea 
0 0.350
(0.030)*
0.804
(0.000)*
-0.001
(0.944)
5 0.323
(0.029)*
0.815
(0.000)*
-0.001
(0.847)
10 0.327
(0.026)*
0.808
(0.000)*
-0.001
(0.988)
Notes to table: In all cases an ARCH (1) or a GARCH(1,1) model was estimated.  The controls dummy variable
takes on the value of one during the control period for Malaysia, and Thailand and zero otherwise.  For the
Philippines and South Korea the dummy variable takes on a value of one during the crisis period and zero
otherwise.  
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Table 8  Daily Stock Returns Variance Equation: Volatility Spillovers With and Without Capital Controls
Bollersev-Woolridge robust standard errors and covariance, GARCH (1,1)
Number of
autoregressive lags
included
ARCH (1) GARCH (1) Controls dummy
Malaysia
0 0.131
(0.000)*
0.882
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.708)
5 0.129
(0.000)*
0.884
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.738)
10 0.146
(0.000)*
0.869
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.652)
Thailand
0 0.140
(0.000)*
0.818
(0.000)*
0.002
(0.082)*
5 0.148
(0.067)*
0.805
(0.000)*
0.002
(0.072)*
10 0.137
(0.000)*
0.828
(0.000)*
0.002
(0.079)*
Philippines
0 0.184
(0.000)*
0.781
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.071)*
5 0.198
(0.000)*
0.766
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.082)*
10 0.216
(0.000)*
0.742
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.056)*
South Korea
0 0.086
(0.000)*
0.910
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.156)
5 0.059
(0.001)*
0.940
(0.000)*
 0.001
(0.187)
10 0.061
(0.001)*
0.938
(0.000)*
0.001
(0.199)
Notes to table: In all cases an ARCH (1) or a GARCH(1,1) model was estimated.  The controls dummy variable
takes on the value of one during the control period for Malaysia, and Thailand and zero otherwise.  For the
Philippines and South Korea the dummy variable takes on a value of one during the crisis period and zero
otherwise.  
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Figure 1: Malaysia
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After The Russian Crisis
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Figure 2 Mutual Funds Flows: Global Spillovers
Notes: The Russian crisis began August 1998.  Mutual fund flows are the average net buying/selling (as percentage
of the end of the preceding quarter holdings) in the two quarters following the outbreak of the crisis, relative to the
sample average.
Source: Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) “Economic Fragility, Liquidity, and Risk: The Behavior of Mutual
Funds during Crises”.
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Figure 3: Thailand
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
Note: Daily bid-ask spread over midpoint spot rate in percent
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Figure 6
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